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„Ökonomie ist nicht alles, aber ohne Ökonomie ist auch militärisch Alles nichts“ 
(Economics is not everything, but without economics also militarically everything is nothing) 
Prof. Dr. Bruno Staffelbach, Universität Zürich 
 
 
 
 Terrorist movements and suicide terrorists can be found in different societies and among 
many religions. History is full with examples. Martyrdom is a phenomenon known from early 
Christhood as a survival strategy against the oppressive Roman state power as well as today’s 
holy warriors with Islam faith. There were always people, who preferred to die instead of giving 
up their religion and/or political preferences for a particular way of living. This section develops a 
new and original look on the troubling phenomenon of terrorism with the eyes of economics.i 
 In the wake of the 11/09 attacks terrorism studies became a rapidly expanding branch of 
literature in social sciences and in particular political economyii. Many valuable insights have 
been found by applying strategic, econometric and economic models to settings in which 
terrorism prevails. However, most of these attempts focus of individual aspects of terrorist 
behavior. Cost-benefit analysis, utility maximization and game theory are then applied to find out 
under what assumptions it is rational to become a terroristiii.  
 Only few authors emphasize the role of institutions, political structures and social 
stratification. Kitschelt (2004) finds that the Middle East accumulates a unique combination of 
factors, which favours a confrontation between a predatory and oppressive regime and a violent 
insurgency. However, most terrorist movements are not directed against internal structures within 
an otherwise homogenous society, but reflect a conflict between different distinct groups, or 
target an external supporter of a specific group.  
 The relation between the economy and terrorism does not reveal itself very easily. 
Krueger and Laitin (2003) find that this relationship is indirect at best. They also quote a 
statement from George Bush, the American presidentiv that “Poverty does not transform poor 
people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, corruption and repression are a toxic 
combination in many societies, leading to weak governments that are unable to enforce order or 
patrol their borders and are vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels.” This approach also 
seems to be supported by Abadie (2005), who finds that there is no correlation between terrorism 
and economic development, but there is a strong hump-shaped correlation with political 
suppression.  
 What is missing in the current economic literature on terrorism is an explanation why 
terrorist groups exist at all and why they find enough material support to function actively. 
Scheckenecker (2002) analyzed successful and failed cases of ethnic conflicts in Europe and 
finds that a peaceful exit from the conflict is possible if there is power sharing possible between 
the ethnic majority and minority and if it is underpinned by strong rules. Power sharing makes 
sense economically if it allows for more distribution for all partners compared with what would be 
possible in case of conflict.     
 Just to recapitulate: terrorism is a violent attempt to overthrow a legitimate government or 
at least to force it to refrain from exercising its legitimate power in certain areas, against a 
specific group in the population or concerning a specific type of contracts by spreading fear 
among the civilian population.v In technical terms terrorism implies negative sum games for the 
society as a wholevi. Even if terrorist organizations are successful they will find less to be 
distributed then there was available before. Terrorism is therefore always about a struggle over 
the current distribution of property rights and the resources used for this struggle are 
considerablevii. This will also include the distribution of status rights, meaning the identification of 
specific members of the society, who can exercise certain privileges. Often control over raw 
materials, but also access to foreign humanitarian aid is playing a decisive role in violent 
conflicts.viii 
 Economics as science is a very young discipline which developed after societies reached 
a level of development above subsistence and introduced democratic political systemsix. 
Economics therefore is about making choices in order to reach a goal. Firms decide about what, 
how and how much they produce. Consumers decide about what and how much they consume. 
They also decide how they use their property, including their human capital or labor force, in 
order balance income with consumption and savings plans. Politicians – defined as 
representative rule-setters for the society - set the framework for these choices, by defining what 
is allowed and what not, as well as setting a mechanism in place, which regulates sanctions in 
case of contract violations. In such societies the power monopoly of the state is generally 
accepted. Part of these framework conditions is the definition of property rights as well as rules, 
which determine how property can be acquired, transferred and confiscated.  
 Modern economics aims at understanding how the economy is working under different 
framework conditions and how different policies impact on the choices of consumers and 
producers. A crucial precondition for this type of analysis is to assume that individual actors know 
what is good and better for them and that they make choices in order to improve their situation. 
Once choices are made they become contracts, which have to be honored. Such an economy is 
called a “market economy”. It reflects a system in which choices are possible, made freely. It also 
requires that contracts, which are in line with the framework conditions, can be enforced and that 
legitimate property rights can be exercised. 
 An economic approach to understand the phenomenon of terrorism therefore implicitly 
assumes that terrorists and their supporters are choosing their way, because their perception of 
benefits exceeds the associated costs.x By definition, terrorists and the organizations backing 
them, do not respect the power monopoly of the state. Such organizations also do not accept the 
conclusions of existing institutions, which are concerned with the generation, confiscation or 
redistribution of property rights. As a first step one therefore has to understand, why terrorism is 
the exception and not the rule in the struggle over the distribution of property rights. The 
significance of this approach lies in its conclusions. If it turns out that terrorism has also economic 
roots it means that a military approach alone will not necessarily solve the problem. It may also 
mean that a military solution will be successful only with the complete elimination of the enemy. It 
does mean that a peaceful solution will not always exist, quite on the contrary. If the struggle is 
over property rights it must be assumed that any participant in the conflict will not give in 
voluntarily. In such cases the economic analysis would reveal what is at stake.  Skaperdas 
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(1992) has shown that in the absence of clearly defined and generally accepted property rights 
conflict can become a rational outcome. 
 Having said so answers the question at the beginning, about how much economics can 
contribute to the explanation about the phenomenon of terrorism, already to some extent: 
economies, in which actors are self determined and accept the framework conditions, cannot 
generate terrorism as a rational choice in order to improve personal or collective wellbeing. If a 
country is open to redistribution of income and wealth via the market while applying a rule of law 
and observing the power monopoly of the state, it is not rational to undermine the positive 
outcome of such activities.xi Even if an individual would find to be disadvantaged by a specific 
transaction and would prefer not to honor the respective contract, this would not be supported by 
others. The main reason for a general preference for lawful behavior is that it is not 
predetermined in advance who will gain or loose and therefore everyone can be considered a 
potential winner in advance. Success and failure in such societies and economies are considered 
to be individual and not collective outcomes of external constraints and circumstances.  
 Bruno Frey (2004) rightly concludes that terrorism in a functioning market economy is less 
likely to be successful. The basic reason for this is that participation in the regular economy will 
deliver a positive return, while terrorism always generates a negative return. Freely and self-
determined agents would therefore rule out terrorist activities from their feasible choices.  
 Attempts of terrorism in well developed economies of this type were undertaken in 
Germany (“Baader-Meinhof-RAF”) and Italy (“brigate rossi” – “red brigades”), but neither 
achieved their goals nor could last longer than a short period. In successful economies terrorism 
is identified as a negative sum game, which reduces the amount of wealth to be distributed to the 
members of its society and it will therefore not find the necessary support. If people see that they 
can improve their situation better by accumulating human capital by learning and financial capital 
by saving they will neither engage nor support terrorism.  
 A particularly illuminating example for such an abated terrorist movement can be found in 
South Tyrol after the Second World War. This region with a predominantly German speaking 
population was allocated to Italy after the First World War. Industrialization and resettlement 
during the fascist rule of Mussolini threatened the cultural and economic foundation of the 
indigenous population. After the Second World War a separatist movement emerged, which 
carried out a number of spectacular attacks, mainly against energy transport infrastructure. 
Finally the German speaking population was granted some autonomy and the region is now 
among the richest in the European Union. Terrorism would certainly have reduced the 
attractiveness of the region, as well as the incomes of the local population, while obviously a 
peaceful conflict settlement also furthered the economic development of the German speaking 
minority. Terrorism would not have served a purpose in such an environment, although the initial 
conditions seem to have favored violent conflicts.xii 
 Another case, in which it could be argued that the emergence of “normal” economic 
activities put an end to a terrorist movement, is Northern Ireland and the IRA. For many decades 
the two religiously separated fractions of the Northern Irish population were confronted with many 
acts of bloody terrorism as well as the full and sometimes overshooting application of law 
enforcement. It could be argued that the spectacular economic development of Ireland, which 
converted from a reservoir of emigrants to the most attractive target region for immigrants, 
provided an offer for potential Northern Irish terrorists, which could hardly be rejected. Now 
Northern Ireland is ruled by a “grand coalition” of Protestants and Catholics.xiii  
 Contrary to these two cases many more examples of continuing terrorist activity prevail. 
Cravin and Chalk (2003) mention the separatist movements in South Philippines (Mindanao) and 
the Palestinian territories as examples of unsuccessful development efforts with respect to 
reducing support for terrorist activities. As reasons for failure the authors mention endemic 
Palestinian corruption and oppressive Israeli tactics, together with a lack and unreliability of 
funding. In other words, putting efforts and wealth into work and entrepreneurship is less 
promising than claiming a larger share from the existing cake by force.  Sharansky (2006) argues 
that Israel’s and its supporters inability to support the establishment of a free and prosperous 
Palestinian society contributes to the perpetuation of terrorism.  
 In which situations could therefore rational agents decide to support or become 
terroristsxiv and when can groups secure enough resources in order to carry out their deadly 
activities although an open, market economy driven system would be available as an alternative? 
Why are liberal democracies and their representatives becoming a target?xv We have to assume 
that the group choosing to use a terrorist strategy is unified by certain characteristics, a religionxvi, 
a minorityxvii, maybe also an ideologyxviii, typically also concentrated in a certain region. Two 
conditions then have to work together:  
 First, the society is an “end game” over the distribution of valuable property rights: 
Choosing to participate in the alternatively available open system – in other words to integrate 
into the majority society - must have a negative impact on the property rights of the group in 
question. This could be because this group is living on income, which is protected by entry 
barriers. Economically speaking this income must have the character of a rent, which is a transfer 
of income, for which no equivalent transfer of goods and services exists. Examples for this are 
the control over the exploitation of raw materials, the control of transit routes, or also a privileged 
access to foreign aid. The situation could be considerably complicated in case of the parallel 
presence of organized criminals, who use the emerging chaos for their own, money-making 
purposes. However, the rewards from organized crime can also be subsumed under the same 
category of rents gained from the absence of law enforcement.xix 
 Second, the limited mobility condition: There must be a mechanism, which prevents that 
individuals in this group choose to integrate with into the majority society or just leave and look 
for a better life somewhere else. This mechanism could be an economic interest, for instance if 
each member of the terrorist group will share the available income, which is generated in the way 
described in the previous paragraph. Other mechanisms could be the loyalty with a religion or 
minority.xx Finally, there is always an element of force, which makes it difficult for members of the 
terrorist group to defect. Such a mechanism is greatly enhanced, if mobility is restricted. The 
basic characteristics of such a mechanism (frequent use of force, secrecy, limited mobility) make 
it all the more likely that organized crime is also playing a role.xxi Strict entry barriers in attractive 
host societies (Europe, Northern America, Australia) could play a role on the surface, although it 
seems as if entry barriers are less effective to enforce than exit barriers. 
 How does this approach fit the most widespread and spectacular examples of terrorism? 
Can this economic approach explain terrorism in Palestine, Chechnya, Cashmere or Turkey? 
Can we find the two elements, which prevent the integration of the minority group and favour the 
conduct and support of terrorist acts? Without pretending the deep and necessary analysis, the 
economic background of Palestinian terrorism is checked as to whether the two above mentioned 
conditions for an “economic rationality” behind can be found.  
 The Palestine population is mainly living on external contributions. The domestic 
economy is crippled and a large part of the adult male population is unemployed. Living 
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conditions for the majority are miserable while a few leaders can afford a luxurious life style, 
partly abroad. Foreign aid is channeled through controlled networks and corruption is endemic. 
The inflow of foreign aid is tied to the refugee status of the population, which is kept in camps 
since three generations. The rent character of Palestinian income was underlined by the violent 
internal fights between the incumbent Al-Fatah, the forces of the president and Hamas over 
control of ministries and flows of funds. 
 The mobility of the population is severely restricted. Palestinians cannot move freely on 
their own territory and also international mobility is restricted through visa requirements. This is 
also true for Palestinians living abroad, like in Lebanon. In Jordan the refugee population was 
driven out of the country and only a small minority of privileged Palestinians manages to settle 
permanently abroad. This is a stark contrast to other violent and forced dislocations. The several 
million German refugees, who fled to Western Germany were quickly integrated into a booming 
economy and relatively easily overcame the material shock of being a refugee and deprived of all 
savingsxxii. It seems to be very difficult for Palestinian refugees to settle in other Arab countries. 
This could hint to the dominance of rents as incomes in these countries. While economies where 
income is dominated by the remuneration of active labor benefit from the availability of more 
labor in rent dominated economies more heads mean more among whom to share. Such 
economies therefore tend to be closed, which reduces the mobility of a refugee population 
considerably. 
 In the case of Palestinian terrorism the conditions for an economic rational behind 
violence seem to be fulfilled. Large flows of rent income are tied to the perpetuated misery of the 
refugee population in form of aid from international organizations and transfers from other Arab 
countries. The distribution of these funds provides good opportunities for personal enrichment. 
The restricted mobility of the refugees restricts their choices tremendously. This in turn makes 
the recruitment of fighters and suicide attackers possible. Significant contributions for Palestine 
are coming from the oil-rich countries of the Arab peninsula and the Persian Gulf. These 
payments originate from rent income itself – the revenues from permissions to extract oil and gas 
by international companies. It seems that some of these payments are deliberately targeting the 
financing of terrorist organizations and activities.  
 All in all one could summarize that Palestinians are fulfilling a “demand for terrorism”, 
which generates income for those in power. Fighting will continues as long as these fractions are 
not properly compensated or shown an alternative with a dominating stream of revenues. This 
conclusion also seems to be confirmed by the inability of the superior Israeli occupation forces 
together with American logistic support to find a military answer. So long every retaliation 
measure, every targeted killing of Palestinians, the removal of Arafat and the severe reduction of 
mobility did not weaken the ability of the militant factions to carry out terrorist activities.  
 As long as Palestinian authorities have access to funds, which do not rely on the virtues 
of a law abiding society following market economy principles, but which may be redistributed by 
means of force, terrorism will be a central element in securing these sources for one or the other 
fraction. 
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The hawala system of transfers, which is frequently used by Islamic terrorist groups, relies on the 
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Institutional Foundations of Al Qaida’s Global Financial System. Mimeo. 2002. 
  
xxi
Schneider (2002) is pointing to the rapidly growing share of the underground economy in western 
countries like Germany or Italy. Schneider, F.  (2002). Money Supply for Terrorism - The hidden financial 
flows of Islamic terrorist organisations: Some preliminary results from an economic perspective. Paper 
prepared for the workshop “The Economic Consequences of Global Terrorism” organized by DIW Berlin, 
June 14-15, 2002. 
  
xxii
This does not want to suggest that the German refugees after the war were not suffering from 
the loss of their homelands. Even now, many decades after the event they participate in annual meeting, 
dressed in local costumes, to remember their old homes and ancestors. 
  
